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RETALIATION: THE ABUSIVE AFTERMATH OF REPORTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

According to a report titled "Embattled;'
Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates at least
sixty-two percent of military sexual assault
victims experience some form of personal or
professional retaliation after reporting an assault
through standard military channels. The Department of Defense, NGOs, and several initiatives have extensively researched the causes and
consequences of retaliation that many survivors
face. Although the military has made significant
advances in recognizing and reporting sexual
assault within its ranks, the U.S. is additionally bound by its obligations under the United
Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture to
ensure victims receive appropriate protections.
Retaliation can take many different forms,
with varying levels of severity, and the military
rarely holds accountable those who punish or
blame reporting victims. The Department of
Defense estimates that only one in four victims
report sexual assaults to the appropriate military
authorities. Victims' fears about professional and
personal backlash weigh significantly on their
willingness to report sexual assault.
HRW notes that many victims who do
report often state that the abusive aftermath of
reporting sexual assault is more dehumanizing
than the assault itself. Victims who report often
risk their careers within the military, a consequence often not faced by those who perpetrate
the assaults. Many survivors recounted major
changes in the work assigned to them. Most
were moved from high-level tasks that require
training and expertise to more menial tasks
like collecting garbage. Survivors are regularly
passed over for promotions and training. Many
tell of how their performance evaluations plummeted. Reporting can also open up a survivor
to excessively severe scrutiny in the form of
disciplinary actions. The military's disciplinary
system exacerbates retaliation against victims

by allowing his or her superior to take different
administrative actions to enforce "good behavior
and discipline:' Superiors who retaliate against
a reporting victim often use these actions to
punish and to discourage a victim from pushing
his or her case forward.
As a party to the UN Convention Against
Torture, which it ratified in 1994, the U.S. is obligated to comply with its provisions. Moreover,
the Committee Against Torture (CAT) is authorized to supervise the implementation of the
Convention. In 2014, CAT reminded the U.S.
government of its obligation to protect victims
and to ensure their rights before and after reporting. CAT recommended that the U.S. ensure
the protection of victims who come forward
from ill treatment or intimidation throughout
the reporting process.
CAT recommends reforming the standards
and procedures of military justice and upholding the legal obligations of the Convention
Against Torture, steps critical to ending the
abuse and victimization of women and men
who serve in all branches of the U.S. military.
As a party to the Convention Against Torture,
the U.S. is obligated to provide "prompt, impartial, and effective'' investigations of allegations
of sexual violence, ensure complainants and
witnesses are protected from retaliation and reprisals, and ensure equal access to compensation
for survivors.
In the U.S., Supreme Court precedent
prohibits members of the military from bringing claims for any injuries suffered during the
course of their service. Sexual violence falls into
this category, as do some violations of a service
member's constitutional rights. Additionally,
federal courts of appeals have barred veterans
from bringing gender discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Typically,
Title VII would hold employers accountable for
sexual harassment and misconduct.
In its Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Fact Sheet, the Department of Defense
estimates that around 8,500 women and 10,500
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men experience unwanted sexual contact while
serving in the military. An untold number of
these veterans will not report their assaults out
of fear for their careers, physical safety, and
emotional wellbeing. In order to truly eradicate
the pervasiveness of sexual violence within the
military, organizations like HRW believe that
the U.S. must improve outreach and strengthen
whistleblower protection for victims of military
sexual assault both before and after reporting.

By Lindsey White, staff writer
THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Until 2013, anyone born in the Dominican
Republic (DR) gained citizenship automatically.
In September 2013, the Constitutional Court
of the DR (Law 168-13) stripped citizenship of
persons who could not prove that at least one of
their parents was Dominican. The ruling applied
to people born between 1929 and 2010, a group
of approximately 240,000 Dominicans, the majority of whom were of Haitian descent. Due to
the international condemnation of Law 168-13
in 2014, the DR government passed Special Law
169-14 to reinstate citizenship. This law placed
people into two groups: Group A and Group
B. Group A applies to those already registered
in the Dominican Civil Registry who must go
through a process of nationalization implemented by the Central Electoral Board. Group B
applies to those born in the DR never registered
in the Dominican Civil Registry. They must go
through a lengthy process that reclassifies them
as foreigners, and after two years, they may gain
Dominican citizenship. Human Rights Watch
(HRW) reported that many registered still faced
discrimination and have difficulty obtaining
birth certificates or registering their children in
school. Others have faced deportation.
While the DR was sorting out the registration process for stateless Dominicans, the
government implemented a National Regularization Plan in December 2013 to grant legal
status to migrants so they can obtain citizenship
or residency status. As part of the plan, the
almost half a million undocumented workers

in the Dominican Republic had to register with
the government by June 17, 2015 or face deportation. Even though more than two-thirds of undocumented migrants or Dominicans of Haitian
decent did register successfully, only two percent
gained legal status. However, ninety-six percent
of those who have applied for legal status do not
have passports or identification documents from
their home country. Moreover, many believe
that the immigration policy is a xenophobic ploy
to rid people of Haitian descent from the DR. As
a result, since June 2015, Haitian migrants and
Dominicans of Haitian descent, the majority of
whom are poor or working class, have fled the
DR to neighboring Haiti, either voluntarily or by
force. Approximately 66,000 people have gone
back to Haiti.
In response, the DR argues that Haiti is
using the DR's legitimate effort to fix its immigration problem as diversion away from its
social and political problems. The DR states that
it is enforcing its immigration laws by deporting
those without legal documents, an immigration
rule that governs any country that abides by the
rule of the law. Jose Tomas Perez, the Ambassador of the DR to the U.S., explains that the
policies that the DR has implemented will protect migrants' human rights and give legal status
to people of Haitian descent who did not have
them to begin with. He vows that the DR will
not deport those born in the DR or unaccompanied minors. Furthermore, he promises that
indiscriminate deportations will not occur, and
that the government will investigate any acts targeting Haitian migrants. Ambassador Perez also
emphasizes that the DR's citizenship policies are
similar to those of Europe and other Caribbean
countries, where citizenship is not a birthright.
Rights groups have called into question the
legality of the Dominican Republic's immigration policies, criticizing Laws 168-13 and 169-14
as violating the fundamental right to nationality.
The American Convention on Human Rights,
which the Dominican Republic has ratified,
codifies this fundamental right in Article 20.
Article 20 of the Convention provides that "no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality;' and that "every person has the right to the
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nationality of the state in whose territory he was
born if he does not have the right to any other
nationalitY:' Law 168-13 left many Dominicans
of Haitian descent virtually stateless, possibly
violating Article 20 of the Convention.
Although Law 169-14 attempts to rectify the
situation, it does not automatically reinstate citizenship. Moreover, Law 169-14 converts members in Group B, who are Dominican citizens,
into foreigners. The DR's National Regularization Plan may also be a violation of fundamental
human rights. Under Article 3 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, it is an inherent
right of a state to expel aliens from its territory.
However, Article 3 places a limit on expulsion,
stating, "expulsion shall be ... without prejudice
to other applicable rules of international law, in
particular those relating to human rights:' It is a
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights for a state to expel an alien arbitrarily
from its borders. An arbitrary expulsion is one
that is unjust or oppressive based on subjective
criteria. Furthermore, Article 14 of the Draft
Articles on Expulsion of Aliens prohibits discriminatory expulsion based race, nationality, or
ethnicity. Thus, while the Dominican Republic
has the right to expel undocumented people
from its borders, it does not have the right to
expel people for discriminatory reasons, or to
deprive people with no other nationality of their
Dominican nationality. On October 23, 2015,
the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights scheduled a hearing on the Right to Nationality in the Dominican Republic to address
the issue.
By Marie Durane, staff writer
AYOTZINAPA MASS DISAPPEARANCES

September 26, 2015, was the one-year anniversary of the disappearance of forty-three male
students in Iguala, Mexico. One year earlier, the
Iguala Municipal Police attacked students from
the Raul Isidro Burgos Normal School in Ayotzinapa. Out of the one hundred students, forty-three faced detainment and later disappeared.
The Mexican government claimed that the police handed over the forty-three students to the
local narco-trafficking gang, Guerreros Unidos,

who killed the students and burned their bodies
in a trash dump in Cocula. The Ayotzinapa case
brought the human rights situation in Mexico
under international spotlight. Between 2007 and
2014, over 23,270 persons disappeared; of these,
the authorities have only located 102. Human
rights organizations are urging Mexico to take
the necessary steps to stop enforced disappearances in compliance with the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) and the
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (IACFD). Mexico is a State
Party to both treaties.
Ayotzinapa students and the families of the
boys who disappeared reacted angrily to the
government's version of the incident, claiming
that the proffered evidence was inconclusive
and insisting that their children were alive. In
November 2014, the Mexican government,
under growing domestic and international
pressure, entered into an agreement with the
legal representatives of the students and their
families to request technical assistance from the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR). In January 2015, the IACHR appointed five renowned experts on criminal prosecution and human rights to form an Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEi). The
group had three primary objectives: to draw up
plans for searching for the disappeared persons
who could still be alive, to provide technical
analysis to the investigation to determine criminal liability, and to undertake a technical evaluation of Mexico's Comprehensive Plan for Attention to the Victims (Plan de Atenci6n Integral
a las Victimas), providing general guidelines to
ensure compensation and access to information
for victims of crimes.
On September 6, 2015, after a six-month
investigation, the Group released a report concluding that the Mexican government's version
of the events was "wrong and not substantiated
by scientific evidence:' The report negated the
Mexican government's version and focused
on the motive behind the attack. The Mexican
government claimed that the Guerreros Unidos mistakenly believed that the students were
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members of a rival narco-trafficking gang. However, the report suggests that the Guerreros Unidos carried out the attack to block the students
from leaving Iguala in a bus used to transport
money and heroin to the U.S. The report further
claims that no other police force of the state took
action to protect the students "in spite of having
knowledge of the facts or being present at some
of the crime scenes:' Experts gave three key
recommendations to the Mexican government:
to continue the search of the missing forty-three
boys, to open new lines of investigation, and to
investigate all authorities who obstructed the
initial investigation.
The report also addresses the issue of enforced disappearances in Mexico, advising Mexico to pass comprehensive legislation regarding
enforced disappearances as required by Article
4 of the ICPPED. Article 4 creates an obligation
for every state "to take the necessary measures
to ensure that enforced disappearances constitute an offence under the state's criminal law:'
The GIEi report also urges the Mexican government to satisfy the right to truth for the victims'
families, granting adequate access to information. Article 24(2) of the ICPPED establishes the
right of the victims "to know the truth regarding
the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person:'
Finally, the GIEi called for the establishment of
protocols to search for the disappeared persons in order to effectively comply with Article
24(3) of the ICPPED, which calls for each state
to "take all appropriate measures to search for,
locate, and release disappeared persons and, in
the event of death, to locate, respect, and return
their remains:'
Human rights organizations like Amnesty
International and the Washington Office of Lat in America strongly criticized the government
and expressed their concern about "the government's grave mishandling of the case:' Human
Rights Watch has defined the ongoing situation
as the "worst human rights crisis in Mexico
since 1968:' Moreover, human rights organizations are pressuring the Mexican government to
implement the recommendations stated in the

GIEi report in order to put an end to mass disappearances. Failure to comply with the IACHR
report's recommendations may constitute a violation of Mexico's obligations under the ICPPED
and the IACFD.
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the second Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) of the United States, the United
Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted
its concluding report regarding the u.s: human
rights record on September 24, 2015. The review
process allowed Member States of the HCR to
assess the u.s: compliance with its human rights
obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and every human rights
instrument the United States is party to and to
give recommendations. The review resulted in
343 recommendations on human rights issues
such as racial discrimination, the closing of the
detention center at Guantanamo Bay, the abolition of the death penalty, and the ratification of
additional human rights treaties.
Most of the recommendations focused on
the issue of racial discrimination. The recent
cases of police killing young African-Americans
drew the international community's attention
to the state of minority relations and discrimination in the U.S. Many states urged the U.S. to
take additional measures to fight racial discrimination, such as implementing programs
to improve police-community relations and
investigating the root causes of police brutality
and discrimination. In response, the U.S. pointed to its ongoing work to solve the problem
of discrimination. In particular, the American
delegation mentioned the Department of Justice's work in bringing criminal charges against
police officers, about 400 in the last four years.
The U.S. showed its commitment to fight against
racial discrimination by accepting almost every
recommendation on the subject. In addition, the
U.S. made a few important pledges to eliminate
racial bias in the administration of capital pun-
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ishment.
The review also addressed the detention
camp at Guantanamo Bay, with many states
urging the U.S. to shut down the facility. The
U.S. reaffirmed President Obama's commitment
to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay
but rejected the premise that the country was
detaining prisoners at Guantanamo illegally.
The U.S. is required to follow the recommendations regarding racial discrimination in
police practices under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the UDHR. In particular,
Article S(b) of the CERD requires that States
Parties guarantee to everyone, without distinction of race, "the right to security of person and
protection by the State against violence or bodily
harm, whether inflicted by government officials
or by any individual group or institution:' Article 7 of the UDHR states that "all are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination:'
The recommendations that call for the closing of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay
resonate with the obligations that the U.S. has
under the UDHR, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). Article 5
of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR state
that "no one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment:' Article 10(1) and (2) of the ICCPR
require respectively that "all persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person'' and that "the penitentiary system
shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation:' Article 2(1) of the CAT
calls on every State Party to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction:' Finally, Article 11 of the CAT
requires states to "keep under systematic review
interrogation rules, instructions, methods, and
practices as well as arrangements for the custody
and treatment of persons subjected to any form
of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any
territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to

preventing any cases of torture:'
Following the formal adoption of the UPR
in Geneva, the United States has four years to
implement the accepted recommendations.
Human Rights Watch criticized the U.S. for not
effectively implementing the recommendations
accepted in the first UPR in 2010 and expressed
its concern that the United States might "use
the process more as a way to highlight its current policies than to commit to improving its
record on human rights at home:' Failure to take
adequate steps to comply with the final recommendations may constitute a violation of the
United States' obligations under the UDHR, the
ICCPR, the CAT, and the CERD. The Human
Rights Council will decide on the measures to
take in case of persistent non-cooperation by a
state with the UPR.
By Chiara Vitiello, staff writer
A REBELUTIONARY AGREEMENT IN COLOMBIA

On September 23, 2015, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the top leader of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
People's Army (FARC-EP), Rodrigo Londono
Echeverri, signed a preliminary agreement in La
Habana, Cuba on the issue of transitional justice. The agreement may represent an important
step toward ending the conflict that Colombia
has endured for many decades. However, potential amnesties for FARC militants and unclear
definitions of some key terms within the agreement raise fears among human rights groups
and victims that not all human rights abusers
will go through an unbiased process of justice.
The agreement provides for the creation
of a "Special Jurisdiction for Peace;' consisting
of a tribunal and special courts, to determine
accountability for past human rights violations.
The tribunal will primarily consist of Colombian
judges, who will have jurisdiction over all the
parties to the conflict who are accused of 'grave
crimes: Colombia has not yet established a process of selecting judges, but it has recognized the
importance of selecting neutral judges due to
the highly politicized nature of the Colombian
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judiciary. The agreement further provides that
if a defendant acknowledges his or her responsibility for serious crimes, the sentence will be a
five- to eight-year 'restriction ofliberty' instead
of a jail sentence. However, if the defendant denies responsibility and is guilty of the crime, he
or she will face a prison sentence of up to twenty
years. For those who confess and contribute to
truth telling, the courts will give special treatment because of the importance of the rights
and needs of victims in this peace agreement.
Furthermore, the agreement establishes
amnesty for defendants accused of "political and
associated crimes:' In support of the agreement,
Jose Miguel Vivanco, the Americas director at
Human Rights Watch (HRW), stated that HRW
"fully supports Colombia's efforts to obtain a
peace agreement that would end years of bloodshed:' However he said that it was imperative to
note that while special treatment may incentivize confessions, it could also allow those responsible for the crimes to avoid a more meaningful
form of justice-imprisonment. Although this
amnesty law is not available to defendants accused of "grave crimes;' the lack of a definition
of "associated crimes" creates a fear of injustice
among victims. Amnesty International cautions
that "[t]he [agreement's] focus on the 'most
responsible' [perpetrators] could ensure that
many human rights abusers avoid justice since
the term has not been clearly defined:'
In the early 1990s, the Colombian government could grant pardons to alleged human
rights abusers with no restrictions. However,
unrestricted pardons ended in 2002 when
Colombia ratified the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. As a result, the
newly signed agreement must include legal
prohibitions on the amnesties it grants so that
victims are not impeded from obtaining access
to judicial remedies and atrocities do not go
unpunished. The International Criminal Court
(ICC) optimistically noted that "the agreement
excludes the granting of any amnesty for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and is designed, amongst others, to end impunity for the
most serious crimes:' Furthermore, the agreement requires conditioning amnesty benefits

on the FARC disarming within sixty days of
reaching the final agreement, and FARC must
sign the final agreement no later than March 23,
2016.
The comprehensive agreement, which covers
more than fifty points, is not yet available in its
entirety. However, as far as international law is
concerned, if the unpublished points mirror the
reasoning of what is currently in the public eye,
no objections are likely. Most of the alleged human rights abusers will not be going to jail, but
they will also not be wandering on the streets
without facing justice. The next steps toward
signing and implementing the final agreement
will require close monitoring.
LAND RIGHTS: PRESERVING
BRAZILIAN INDIANS' TRADITIONAL WAYS OF LIFE

It is common knowledge that Brazil is the

largest, most populated country in Latin America. It is less common knowledge, however, that
Brazil's indigenous population is currently facing a number of critical issues that threaten the
future of its people. Even during the first-ever
World Indigenous Games-which was recently
held in October 2015 to highlight indigenous
cultures and values-there was little discussion
about issues that impact rights, land ownership, and culture preservation for the Brazilian
Indians.
The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI),
an executive agency set up to ensure the protection of indigenous interests, currently handles
the mapping of indigenous territories in Brazil.
A proposed constitutional amendment known
as PEC 215 would transfer the power of demarcating indigenous land from the executive
branch (FUNAI) to the legislative branch (Congress). This transfer of power could have huge
implications on the indigenous people, as many
fear it will eventually allow Congress to reduce,
reverse, or even deny the demarcation of land to
indigenous people. Brazilian indigenous groups,
human rights defenders, and environmental
activists fear that Congress will cave to pressure
from corporations and instead open the land for
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their use which may represent a step backwards
in the fight to preserve Brazilian Indians' traditional ways of life.
Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution
recognizes indigenous peoples and guarantees
them permanent possession and exclusive use
of their traditional lands including the "riches of
the soil, [and] the rivers and the lakes existing
therein;' but excluding subsoil such as mineral
resources. Demarcating land as "indigenous" secures the Brazilian Indians' rights as recognized
in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Under
President Dilma Rousseff, there have been fewer
demarcations granted than under any other government since 1988. This is largely because legislative proposals from congresspeople representing large agri-businesses, mining corporations,
and the dam industry-all of whom intend to
take the land from indigenous peoples and open
it to development-have obstructed the demarcation process. To date, FUNAI has mitigated
the problem somewhat because it is less hostile
to indigenous interests and holds more distant
relationships with the private corporations.
The land rights and cultural interests of the
Brazilian Indians stand to change dramatically
with the shift in power that is proposed by PEC
215. Within Brazil's Congress, there is a faction known as the Bancada Ruralista, a group
of legislators who have transferred jurisdiction
over private multinational companies to the
legislative branch. Since the Bancada Ruralista
today dominates Congress, it is highly unlikely
that Congress would grant new demarcations
if the PEC 215 passes. As Brazilian indigenous
activist, Narube Werreria from the Karaja nation
states, "[s]oon, there will be no more indigenous peoples, no more forest, no more animals:'
If PEC 215 becomes law, Congress is likely to
decrease the establishment of indigenous lands
and protected areas, which would create major
deterrent for Brazil to meet its commitments to
international agreements and cause irreparable
environmental destruction.
Human rights defenders and environmental
activists are concerned that political considerations will lead lawmakers to ignore Brazil's obligations under international law regarding indig-

enous peoples' rights, and to base their decisions
instead on economic expediency. Fiona Watson,
the research director for Survival International,
stated that "many Indians consider PEC 215 a
move to legalize the theft and invasion of their
lands by agri-businesses. It will cause further
delays, wrangling, and obstacles to the recognition of their land rights:' Furthermore, Watson
compared this situation to "put[ ting] the fox in
charge of the hen-house:'
As a Member State of the Organization of
American States (OAS), Brazil is subject to the
jurisdiction of the IACHR and bound by the obligations established in the OAS Charter and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man. Moreover, Brazil has ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, as well as the
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights
oflndigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). International
Labor Organization Convention No. 169 links
the rights of indigenous peoples to social, economic, and cultural rights, specifically as to their
relationship to the land. Similarly, Article 26( 1)
of the UNDRIP states that "Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired:' Under
Article 41 of the UNDRIP, states have an obligation to ensure indigenous peoples' participation
in all of the measures that may affect them.
On October 27, 2015, a parliamentary
committee for demarcation of native areas approved the proposed constitutional agreement,
PEC 215. Now, it must make its way through
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and
President Dilma Rousseff must sign it for it to
become law. Opponents may appeal the amendment to the Supreme Court, which could reject
the newly created amendment if it believes that
it is unconstitutional and violates the rights of
indigenous peoples. If PEC 215 is not closely
monitored or if the rights of Brazilian Indians
are not appropriately represented, it may cause
tribal cultures to disappear, and Brazil could lose
an irreplaceable part of its heritage.
By Jazmin Chavez, staff writer

